Text to "Soviet Preparations and Victory"

The following is the text to the YouTube video called "Soviet Preparations and Victory."

I’m going to go into detail about how and why the Soviets defeated the Nazis during WWII. I hope to crush some capitalist and Nazi myths along the way.

The standard myth popularized by U.S. and British imperialist apologists attributes the Soviet victory to the availability of limitless human hordes used as cannon-fodder, and vast stocks of U.S. donated arms. This exhausted the enemy. Russian winters also get a big play in these fairy tales-as if the weather had been warmer for the communists than for Nazis.

Hitler had at his disposal one hundred eighty million Germans and active German allies and one hundred thirty million conquered people whose labor power, unwillingly, aided the fascist war effort. With his vast labor reserves, Hitler could mobilize an army numbering between fifteen and eighteen million troops. The Soviets could mobilize about ten million troops. A million of these were needed in the Soviet Far East and on the Afghan, Iranian, and Turkish borders, more than offsetting the Nazis’ need for troops to occupy western Europe. Nazi manpower superiority at the time of the invasion can therefore be reckoned as three to two. The quality of Soviet materiel was second to none. As far back as 1935 Nazi General Guderian noted the superiority of Soviet tanks and tractors. Nazi Colonel von Bulow praised the high technical level of Soviet war planes and cited the USSR’s capacity to continue military production indefinitely for a protracted war. Nonetheless, Germany invaded the Soviet Union enjoying a 5:2 Quantities superiority in the hardware of warfare, thanks to Hitler’s previous victories. The Nazis had inherited the rest of Europe’s arsenal practically intact and controlled Europe’s entire war industry. Within the first month of the invasion, however, the Nazi blitzkrieg was stalled. The Red Army suffer-e massive losses but couldn’t be knocked out in the first round. On the contrary: it gave better than it got. At its fastest, the blitzkrieg never exceeded fifty percent of the Nazis’ rate of advance in conquering western Europe. By the end of the war’s third month, the Hitlerites had lost one-third of their original invading force and equipment. By the fourth month the Red Army stopped the Wehrmacht at Smolensk for an entire month. By the fifth month the Nazis had been slowed to one-sixth of their initial rate. The war’s essential course had been determined before the end of 1941. Although the turning point was to come months later during the heroic battle of Stalingrad, and although the Soviet working class needed a Herculean collective effort to win, the beginning of the end had already appeared for the Nazis.

The Wehrmacht bit the dust largely because the Soviet Union’s forces enjoyed overwhelming ideological superiority. Hitler’s troops fought to conquer “living space” for the “master race.” The Soviet troops, though enveloped in a nationalist cloud, fought for the glimpse of communism that a generation of socialist life had given them: Men, offtcers, and generals alike, understand that any conqueror will rob them of their collectively owned factories, farms, schools, theaters, museums, will halt further improvement and progress and strip them of their freedom and of other values that make their life worth living. This is thoroughly understood from the top-ranking marshall down to the company cook. This consciousness is part of the Red Army morale, which is part and parcel of the morale of the whole nation.

Divided into three distinct but complementary groups: the Red Army, fighting in the front zone; the guerrilla army, spreading havoc throughout the Nazi rear; and the armed population, denying the fascists access to the Soviet rear. The concept of the Soviet people in arms is not well known in the West and merits mention, The magnitude of the Soviet war effort cannot be comprehended otherwise. Stalin had figured since the 1919 War of Intervention that the imperialists would not give up their dreams of reconquering Russia and smashing socialism. The only issue in doubt was whether the second invasion would involve as much inter-capitalist unity as the first, and Soviet diplomacy was devoted to splitting the Soviet camp. In any event, the Soviet Union had to prepare. Contrary to the rehashed lies of vulgar western anti-communists who pretend that the Soviet people mysteriously rose up all of a sudden in 1941 despite their leaders, history shows that these leaders had meticulously planned for war since the 1930s. They tried to avoid war, but they also prepared to fight to win if war was imposed on them. Production for war formed a key element of the plan. Defense appropriations rose From 395 million rubles in 1924 to 34 billion in 1938. The Red Army’s motor component (the number of mechanical horsepower per soldier) rose from 2.6 in 1929 to 13.8 by the end of 1938. Soviet tractor plants were constructed to be easily convertible into tank plants. Starting from scratch, by 1935-6, the U.S.S.R. already boasted seventy-four aircraft factories, of which the most important group was situated well beyond the reach of enemy bombers. Therefore, Soviet tank and aircraft production had been guaranteed six years before the invasion. The most impressive aspect of socialist preparations for war, however, remained the human side. Right after the invasion, Soviet ability to wage guerrilla operations in the Nazi rear proved decisive. How was such activity possible? “How is it,” asked military historian Sergei Kourashoff, “that plain peasants, working men, clerks, teachers, and such can pit their strength against the mighty Wehrmacht? Where did they learn the use of modern arms?” (op. cit., p. 204). The answer is simple. For years beforehand the Soviet government had armed, trained, and organized the entire population for total war in the future. The Soviet government was not afraid to arm its people. It was not afraid to teach its people military science. It welcomed these developments and considered them necessary. It had full confidence in the majority of the population, and this attitude was reciprocated. Such a relationship between government and people is absolutely inconsistent with the absurd premise that Stalin ruled like a “despot” and that his power emanated from the intimidation of the masses.

The “Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Air Force and Chemical Defense” did a lot of work. It carried out military training among all sections of the Soviet population, particularly among youth. Instruction was provided by army reserve officers and included marksmanship, horse cavalry skills, aviation, parachuting, skiing, and other military sports. In 1938, six million adults and millions more youth had won riflery badges. Every farm had its civil defense group which had learned sharp shooting and had weapons. Here was a guerrilla band already formed.

The Red Army that smashed the Nazis had the highest political and cultural level of any army in the world. In 1930, it boasted eight thousand alcoves for study and recreation, eight hundred clubs with even better facilities, and ninety-seven Red Army houses lavishly provided with theaters, movie rooms, lecture halls, auditoriums, libraries, exhibit halls, and game rooms. This was only a beginning. By 1939, the alcoves (known as “Lenin Corners”) had grown to 27,435, the clubs to 1,900, and the “palatial” Red Army Houses to 276.

Source:
http://www.plp.org/the-communist/selections/stalinssuccesses.pdf